THE CASE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
HARRY SHULMAN*

The lawyer's task in this symposium is simple and unhappy. He need not speculate about the effects of the Social Security Act on life, on business, on government.
He need not concern himself about the probabilities of expected benefits or suggested
evils. Those thrilling jobs have been assigned exclusively to other contributors.
Moreover, constitutional dogma teaches that, in his professional capacity of advising
on constitutionality, the lawyer, as the judge, need not even persuade himself of the
wisdom or folly, the desirability or undesirability, of the legislation-not even that
the legislation is perhaps a little more wise than foolish or a little more foolish than
wise. It is sufficient if the legislative determination has some reasonable support.
The work of the Committee on Economic Security, the legislative hearings and the
remainder of this symposium establish that support-and beyond peradventure. So
the lawyer's job is simple: "to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked
beside the statute which is challenged" and, "uninfluenced by predilection for or
against the policy disclosed in the legislation," see "whether the latter squares with
the former."'
Observers of the Supreme Court's work tell us, however, that the lawyer's job is
not so mechanical. He must determine not whether the legislation squares with the
Constitution but rather how the tribunal having the power of ultimate decision will
decide. When the Supreme Court is that tribunal, he must guess what at least five
of the nine Justices will decide. Their decision, he is told, may be influene-- by
conscious or subconscious predilections, by earlier conditioning and by psychological'
factors of varying degrees of unpredictability. And certainly, decision involves either
intelligent comprehension or mistaken distortion of the problems with which the
legislation deals, the difficulties which they present, the manner in which the legislation deals with them and the problems of choice which weie resolved by the adoption of that method. The lawyer's job, then, involves all the speculation and uncer*A.B., 1923, Brown University; LL.B., 1926, S.J.D., x927, Harvard University. Member of the New
York and Rhode Island Bars. Associate Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law. Special Counsel,
Railroad Retirement Board. Law clerk to Mr.-Justice Brandeis, United States Supreme Court, 1929-1930.
Contributor to legal periodicals.
'U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 318, 325 (5936); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295
U. S. 330, 346 (935).
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tainty inherent in economic or social forecasting. Yet, the economist or sociologist
is rarely proved to his own satisfaction completely, or even partly, wrong. He can
lay non-realization of his prophecy, not to his error, but to the intervention of other
factors; or he can urge that conditions would have been still bett~r or worse had
his suggestions been followed or rejected. But the lawyer has no such solace. When
the Supreme Court has decided, his prediction was either right or wrong, and beyond
cavil-unless, indeed, he can find comfort in the thought, expressed by a distinguished veteran of the bar, "the Supreme Court may not accept these views, but I
regard them as sound."
Moreover, the recent T.V.A. decision reminds, at an opportune time, that it is
not constitutional to pass on constitutionality in the abstract. Judical decision must
be rendered only with respect to specific issues raised by specific parties having
specific interest in a specific case within judicial cognizance. No court is empowered
by the Constitution to render opinions on the constitutionality of legislation. The
Supreme Court's power, like that of the inferior federal courts, is only that of deciding cases or controversies appropriate for the exercise of the federal judicial power.
In adjudicating such cases the Court may find it imperative to disregard legislation
because it conflicts with the Constitution. But beyond yielding to this imperative
necessity, as encountered and only to the extent encountered in cases before it, the
Court may not inquire into the constitutionality of congressional legislation.2 This
theory need not be idle liturgy. It should have substantial practical significance.
For, since neither the Constitution nor constitutional theory sets up the jiidiciary
as a third branch of the government to advise on constitutionality and since neither
the Constitution nor constitutional theory creates cases or controversies through
which constitutionality is to be determined by the judiciary, some legislation, a least,
may be beyond the scope of judicial review on this orthodox theory. In such cases,
determination of constitutionality rests with the other branches of the government;
and the enactment of the legislation is conclusive of its constitutionality until there
is a change of mind in those branches. An outstanding feature of the recent work
of the Supreme Court has been the expansion of the area in which it exercises
power.' But that expansion, like other constitutional determinations, has divided
the Court and is subject to the possibilities of the future. There is still vitality in
the orthodox theory and it has considerable significance in discussions of the constitutionality of the Social Security Act.
2

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936).

Both major opinions profess this

dogma and both are limited in deference to it, though in different ways. The opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis refuses to deal at all with the constitutionality of T.V.A.; and the opinion of the Chief Justice
deals with the problem only as related to the Wilson Dam.
'E.g., U. S. v. Constantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223 (1935); Colgate v. Harvey, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935); U. S.
v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct.
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(1936); Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot, 56 Sup. Ct. 249, 374 (1936); Gt.

No. Ry. v. Weeks, 56 Sup. Ct. 426 (1936); Ashwander v. T.V.A., 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936); see Collier,
judicial Bootstraps and the General Welfare Clause (936)

4 Gao. WAmS. L. REv. 211, 217.
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TiTLEs I, III, IV, V, VI, X

These titles, which respectively envisage grants to the states for old-age assistance,
unemployment compensation administration, aid to dependent children, maternal
and child welfare, public health work, and aid to the blind, may be considered
together. 4 None operates on individuals. None requires action from individuals.
All merely provide for federal grants of money to the states, which the states may
take or reject, to aid the states in their performance of the named objects. Some
limit the amount of the federal grant to a percentage of the total to be expended by
the states and condition the grant upon financial participation by the states. Others
make outright grants not conditioned upon any state financial participation. All
impose conditions upon the administration and expenditure of the funds.
Unless the Supreme Court turns its back on a century of constitutionalism and
the judicial power is expanded beyond even its present wide borders, these grantsin-aid are constitutional so long as Congress deems them so. For, while similar
grants-in-aid have been common in our history, the Supreme Court has expressly
disclaimed power to review their constitutionality. In Frothingham v. Mellon and
in Massachusetts v. Mellon5 the Court held that neither a general taxpayer nor the
state had a standing to question the appropriations under the Sheppard-Towner
Maternity Act.' Whether the taxpayer pays small or huge taxes is immaterial, as
indicated in the opinion of the Chief Justice in the T.V.A. case. 7 The point is that
the taxpayer's money is collected for the general use of the government and is not
earmarked for a particular purpose or specifically imposed to recompense for particular expenditures.8 Unlike the processing taxes of the A.A.A., Mrs. Frothingham's taxes were not special taxes imposed in connection with the special scheme
of expenditures. The processors were successful in their challenge of the A.A.A.
taxes because the Court regarded that Act as "one regulating agricultural production" with the tax "a mere incident of the regulation" and an "exaction" from the
processors for bestowal upon the farmers. But the authority of the Maternity eases
'In conversation Title III is commonly linked with Title IX. Naturally, since both relate to unemployment compensation. But for the purpose of inquiring into their constitutionality there is little
justification for linking the two tides together. It can hardly Pe said that the Title IX tax is imposed for
the'purpose of balancing the Tide III appropriation. If the purpose of both titles is to encourage state
unemployment compensation plans, nevertheless they are not integral parts of a single scheme; each holds
forth a separate inducement. Since they are separate titles and since there is not even a budgetary relation
between them-and particularly in view of the separability clause-the constitutionality of each may be
considered independently of the other. The validity of Title IX will be considered presently. If that title
is deemed valid, when considered by itself, it seems inconceivable that its legality is affected by Title II.
Conversely, if that tide is held invalid, when considered by itself, Title III cannot alter the judgment, but
likewise, Title III need not automatically suffer the same fate.
a262 U. S. 447 (1923).

842 STAT. 224 (1921).

756 Sup. Ct. at 470: "While their stock holdings are small, they have a real interest. . . . If otherwise entitled, they should not be denied the relief which would be accorded to one who owned more
shares."

' With respect to the state's suit, there was the additional ground that, since "nothing has been done
and nothing is to be done" under the statute without the states' consent, "it is plain that the question, as
it is thus presented, is political and not judicial in character, and therefore is not a matter which admits
of the exercise of the judicial power."* 262 U. S. 447 at 483.
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was expressly saved." It seems unlikely that the Court will dub the past practice a
"century of error" and undertake to review general government expenditures at the
suit of a general taxpayer or a state.
The grants-in-aid of the Social Security Act are quite like those of the Maternity
Act. Both acts provide for appropriations from general funds in the Treasury.
Neither requires or contemplates special taxes to balance the expenditures. Indeed,
Tide V provides federal expenditures for the very same purposes as the Maternity
Act, and Part 4 of Tide V implements the Vocational Rehabilitation Act previously
in force. The objects of the other grants are of the same character as maternal
welfare. On the issue whether federal expenditures for their welfare are subject to
judicial review, constitutional law does not differentiate between child-bearing
mothers and the blind, the aged, or the crippled children; nor is public health service
or the administration of unemployment compensation on a different constitutional
plane.' 0
If there is no procedure whereby these grants may be subjected to judicial review,
then Congress, not the Court, is the ultimate judge of their constitutionality. And
if the issue of constitutionality should be raised in Congress, the argument for validity
is quite convincing. A century of practice and an abundance of persuasive precedent
are alone weighty considerations. The appropriations are for the "general welfare"
in any intelligible meaning of that phrase. They operate throughout the nation to
aid the states in relieving distress common in all of them, common, that is, in the
nation and directly affecting the national welfare. The states' need of federal aid
in providing for this relief is the outstanding lesson of our current history and is
conceded by all shades of political belief. The expenditures are administered by the
states. They involve no element of regulation or coercion of the kind found by the
Court in the A.A.A. or of any kind. The federal government is not superseding the
state or invading its powers, but on the contrary is aiding it and strengthening its
efforts.
But even a more limited* interpretation of general welfare would include the
national interest in the nation's man-power in connection with its responsibilities
for war and interstate and foreign commerce. The relationship of public health
service and child and maternal welfare on a national scale to the maintenance of
that man-power is quite clear. No less is the nation's concern with the effect on its
man-power of the distress of the aged and unemployed when that distress becomes
a national phenomenon. The argument is not that under its interstate commerce
or war powers, the Congress can enact any legislation which would affect the objects
of those powers, but rather that the nation's interest in war and commerce is relevant
in determining whether the general warfare is promoted by an exercise of the inde'56 Sup. Ct. 312, 315-17.
"Part C, pp. 61-69, of the Appendix to the Brief for the United States in the A.A.A. case contains a
collection of many previous grants in aid. See also Horack, Federal-State Codperation for Social Security:
The Grant-in-Aid (1935) 30 ILL. L. Rav. 292.
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pendent power of appropriation. Whether or not the nation may regulate industry
or individual conduct to prevent such distress, an unencumbered appropriation of
money to be expended by the states for such relief-expenditures calculated to promote stability in purchasing power, to foster physical health, and to avoid starvation
or demoralization throughout the population-is surely for the general welfare even
when that phrase is narrowed in meaning.
"The aged" should not be given a literal meaning which would distort the purpose of the Act. The term refers not so much to a category of persons as to a type
of social maladjustment affecting the population generally. Aged persons are not
a group detached from persons as a whole. They are bound to the rest of the population by family and economic ties which prevent segregation or isolation. The
support of aged persons casts a heavy burden on their younger relatives. Suffering
or demoralization among the aged means also suffering and demoralization among
the younger members of their families. Relief for the aged is relief, moral and
economic, for the young-relief for the population generally. "The aged" describes,
not the beneficiaries of the legislation, but the medium through which the general
welfare is sought to be promoted.
It may be suggested that the grants are in fact encumbered by conditions which
make a difference;--conditions requiring financial participation by the states, statewide operation of the state plans, reports to the Social Security Board, administration
or supervision by a single state agency and with approved methods, fair hearings for
aggrieved individuals and avoidance of unapproved residence or citizenship requirements. But similar conditions commonly encumbered grants-in-aid made in the
past. 1 All of them relate solely to the administration and expenditure of the funds
appropriated. None of them requires conduct unrelated to the expenditure. All are
prudent safeguards dictated by experience to insure economical rather than wasteful
expenditure of the funds, by agencies financially interested rather than agencies
dealing only with "other people's money," for the objects stated rather than for
wasteful administration, openly and under public scrutiny rather than in official
secrecy, for the national welfare rather than for local or individual preferment.
None of these conditions has any resemblance to those condemned in the A.AA.
case. It would be the absence of such prudential conditions, rather than their
presence, which might condemn the Act.
TITLE VIII

The power of Congress to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
"E.g., the Maternity Act required state participation, a state agency, reports by the state agency to the
Federal Children's Bureau, approval of state plans by the federal board, and prohibition in the state planm
against taking children over parents' objections; it prohibited the use of the grant for the purchase,
erection or repair of buildings or equipment and required that the money appropriated by the states be
not used for the payment "of any maternity or infancy pension, stipend, or gratuity"; and it authorized
the withholding of the federal funds upon a finding that the state agency "has not properly expended the
money paid to it or the moneys herein required to be appropriated by such State." 42 STrA. 224-26.
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States' 2 has few limitations in the Constitution. There is first the limitation in
that very grant of power; and there is the further provision in the same section that
"all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Section 9 of Article I also provides that "no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid
unless in proportion to the census or enumeration . . .;" and this prohibition is
modified by the Sixteenth Amendment which authorizes "taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration." To these limitations of the Constitution
must be added those of the judicial gloss,18 that the tax must be really a tax and
not a penalty for conduct which Congress may not otherwise penalize,14 that it
must be a true tax rather than a disguise for, or an integral part of, a scheme of
regulation which Congress may not enact direcdy,' 5 that it must be a tax rather
than an exaction so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a deprivation of property
without due process of law.'
The immediate purpose of the taxes imposed by Tide VIII is unquestionably to
raise revenue. They are, therefore, not subject to the weakness of the taxes condemned in the Child Labor Tax Case'7 or Hill v. Wallace.'8 In those cases, the
taxes were regarded as penalties or regulations because the government obviously
did not desire revenue to result from their imposition. The taxes were imposed for
prescribed conduct which it was clearly hoped would be abandoned under their
compulsion. But it is even clearer that Tide VIII is not intended to discourage
employment, that its success depends upon the production of revenue rather than
avoidance of the tax by abandonment of stated conduct. The taxes are not penalties.
Likewise, neither Tide VIII nor the remainder of the Act attempts to regulate the
conduct of the taxpayers, or of any other individuals,'beyond requiring them to pay
the taxes and make the returns incident to tax collection. The taxes are consequently
not regulations, unless the possible expenditures work a conversion, but that issue
may be postponed for the moment.
The subjects of the tax seem to be dearly within the limits of the constitutional
grant of power to levy "taxes, duties, imports and excises." It is needless to determine what the nature of the tax is, for it certainly falls within one of the four designations. The choice of subjects is unlimited except by the uniformity and apportionment provisions and, perhaps, by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The uniformity clause requires only geographical uniformity, that is, opera'"U.S. CONST., AxRT. 1, §8.
"For full analysis of that gloss,- see Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution (1922) 1
N. C. L. REv. 61; Cushman, Sodal and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation (1933) 18 MINN.
L. REv. 757.
"Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. 8. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922); U. S. v. Constantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223 (x935).
"U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (935).

"Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (x928); Heiner
v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
" Supra note 14.

'Supra note 14.
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tion throughout the United States. 19 Title VIII does so operate. The apportionment provision is applicable only to capitation and other "direct"' taxes. Title VIII
levies neither kind. The taxes are not on the ownership of property or the income
from property so as to fall under the ban of unapportioned "direct" taxes. 20 The
employer's tax refers to his employment of individuals, regardless of whether or not
he has property or income from property. The employee's tax is levied on his income not from property but from personal service, a subject available for taxation
without apportionment even before the Sixteenth Amendment. 2 1 Employment of
others and the derivation of income from personal labor arg readily ascertainable
--economic functions and are, therefore, within the range of subjects available for
federal taxation.
The selection of employment and wages for taxation can hardly offend the due
process clause so as to render the tax in fact an arbitrary deprivation of property.
There is no requirement that the same taxes be levied on all persons in 'the country.
Congress, like the legislatures of all other governments, has made special selections
throughout our entire history as a nation. Manufacture of tobacco and liquors, sugar
refining, use of foreign-built yachts, mining, sales of securities, theatre tickets, gasoline, and luxuries generally, gifts, inheritances, narcotics, land deeds and other legal
documents-these and numerous other things have been subjected to separate federal
taxation.,2 2 The Congressional choice of subjects is quite unlimited.
But attack may be directed at the exemptions. Employers may urge that due
process under the Fifth Amendment implies equal protection of the laws and that
equality is denied by the exemption of employers mentioned in Section 811. It is
doubtful whether the Fifth Amendment is such a limitation upon the taxing power
as to require even the rough approximations of equality required of state laws by
the Fourteenth Amendment which expressly commands equal protection. The
power of selection already discussed is a power to exempt. The difference is only in
verbal statement. The subject of the tax may.be narrowly defined so as to exclude
certain persons by negative implication or it may be defined more broadly with
express exemption of the same persons sought to be excluded. There is no case in
which such an attack upon a federal tax has been sustained or even encouraged.23
5
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (19oo); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 (1929).

'Pollock

v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., X58 U. S. 6oi (1895); Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.,

255 U. S. 288 (192i); Bromley v. McCaughn, 28o U. S. 124 (1929).

' Polloci v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra note x8.
' Almost any geneal revenue act since the war provides abundant precedent for broad .Congressional
discretion in the selection of subjects for taxation. And see Hylton v. U. S., 3 DalI. i7i (1796); Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509 (i899); Thomas v. U. S., 192
U. S. 363 (1904); Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397 (1904); McCray v. U. S., 195
U. S. 27. (904); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 22o U. S. 107 (igii); Billings v. U. S., 232 U. S. 261 (1914);
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 (1g2g); cf. Edelman v. Boeing Air Transp., 289 U. S. 249 (1933);

The Court has sustained selection, for taxation, of anthraFox v. Standard.Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (935).
cite coal from all other coal, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 26o U. S. 245 (1922), of herring from all
other fish, Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921).
' On the contrary, the Court has discouraged such attacks: "Except in rare and special instances, the
due process of law clause contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power
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But even were it otherwise, the exemptions have ample justification. (i) Exemption
of employment by a state and its subdivisions is justified by constitutional limitations
which are similarly operative on the general income tax. (2) A tax by the federal
government on itself and its instrumentalities as employer will hardly be urged.
(3) Exemption of religious, charitable and educational institutions has historic
precedent and long tradition as justification, apart from other considerations relating
to this specific tax. (4)Likewise exemption of agricultural labor, domestic service
and service performed by crews on vessels-simply because of their intrinsic difference from other employment-has sufficient precedent in past practice. 24 And there
are additional considerations. It would be strangely inconsistent, at least now, for
the government to increase the tax burden on agriculture while it is at the same time
searching for means to lift agriculture from its financial plight. The compensation
of all three classes of employment consists largely of maintenance and only partly of
money. Collection of the tax might cost more than the tax would bring. (5)The
similar burden of expenditure and the annoyance to the taxpayer suffice to justify the
exemption of casual labor. (6) Exemption of service performed by a person ,iho is

over 65 years of age may be rested on the desire not to afford additional encouragement for the discharge of, or'refusal to employ, such persons, whose age alone puts
them at a disadvantage.
, These answers may also be made to the complaint that the employee's tax makes
the same exemptions. But here there is the additional quite conclusive answer that
the exempt employees are not given any benefits under Title II of the Act. This is
equally the response to the objection, that the tax is levied only on wage income-apart from the additional fact that it has long been held that an income tax need not
include income from all sources.25
There are other minor objections of inequality. The taxes are not levied on
wages over $3,ooo. An employer having one employee to whom he pays $6,ooo is
taxed upon $3,ooo, while an employer fiaving two employees throughout the year
to each of whom he pays $3,ooo or one employee for six months.at $3,ooo and a
different employee for the other six months, also at $3,ooo, is taxed upon $6,ooo. An
employee earning $6,ooo from one employer is taxed on $3,ooo while an employee
earning $3,000 from each of two employees is taxed on $6,ooo. Such objections assume that the due process clause is an especially sensitive instrument which can cut
exceedingly fine. And they would turn attention away from major features to
minutiae which are of little importance and which can be readily corrected if found
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution." Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 44 (934). See also
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. i (1916) where objections to tax exemptions similar to those
in the Social Security Act were held to be without substance.

The federal taxes which have been declared

unconstitutional under the due process clause have been only those which the Court deemed to be
retroactive; note 16, supra.
' E.g., workmen's compensation acts, taxes on motor vehicles and gasoline.
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra note 2o; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., supra note
23; cf. Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. X9 (930).
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faulty. But each of the objections may be met. The government, in need of
revenue, may, well decide to broaden its tax base and avoid cumulation of taxes. The
$3 ooo limitation may be the result of such an effort. Income above that amount is
subject to the graduated income tax. The possible difference in the employers' tax
which may result from differences in the number of employees to whom the same
aggregate amount of wages is paid is the result, not of unequal, but of equal, treatment. The tax is on the privilege of employment and the privilege is exercised to a
greater extent when a greater number of employees are employed. The number of
employees and the amount of wages paid are both reasonable measures for the tax.20
As for the employee who pays a higher tax because he receives wages from two
employers rather than one, a sufficient answer may be the practical difficulties of
administration which would be involved if the employer's records could not form
the basis for assessment and collection.Y7 "In another sense, moreover, there is
equality." The income tax is an excise on being employed by another for wages.
Two employments may, again, be regarded as a greater exercise of the privilege than
one.28 Like the "numerous and minute, not to say in many respects hypercritical
contentions" made in the Brushaber case, the objections here "rest upon the mistaken
theory that although there be differences between the subjects taxed, to differently
tax them transcends the limit of taxation and amounts to a want of due process." 29
"It is a sufficient answer to say that you cannot carry a constitution out with mathematical nicety to logical extremes."3 0
TITLE II

The scheme of the Act reflects the hope that the validity of the taxes might be
determined without investigation of the expenditure of the funds collected. With
the validity of the taxes thus determined, there would then be no one, in view of
Frothingham u. Mellon, who ould question before the courts the general validity
of the appropriations and expenditures. But the A.AA. decision has shaken the
foundation for that hope. It is still true, of course, that there is no express tie-up
2

Chain store taxes based on the number of stores, regardless of their revenues, have been upheld
despite objection under the equal protection clause. See Fox v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 22. Likewise, with respect to the objection that an employer of one person at $3,ooo: pays a higher tax than an
employer of two pers8ns at Sxooo each, there is precedent in sales taxes.generally. A purchaser of a
$6o suit pays a higher tax than a purchaser of two $2o suits. And see Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S.
124 (1929), where the gift tax was challenged because, by virtue of graduation and exemption, "the tax
levied upon donors of the same total amounts may *be affected by the size of the gifts to individual
donees." The challenge was, of course, unsuccessful. License fees are frequently fixed at a flat .sum
without reference to the amount of business" done by licensees, or are graduated to a maximum which
disregards differences above a certain point.
'N. Y. ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 (1907), involved a stamp tax of two cents on each
hundred dollars of face value of stock for every sale or agreement to sell the same. The tax was challenged under the due process clause because face value rather than actual value was the measure. Said
the Court: "The inequality of the tax, so far as actual values are concened, is manifest. But, here again
equality in this sense has to yield to practical considerations and usage" (at p. 559).
Cf. N. Y. ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, supra note 27.
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 24, 26 (x16).
'Paddle v. New York, 211 U. S. 446, 450 (igo8).
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between the taxes levied by Title VIII and the appropriations authorized by any
other title of the Act. The taxes are not earmarked but go into the general funds
of the government. The appropriations are to be made from the general funds.
There is no exact or textual correspondence between the amounts of the appropriations and the amounts expected from the taxes. And there is no express
dependence of one upon the other. The appropriations are authorized without
reference to possible experience in the tax collection.
It is generally charged, however, that there is at least a budgetary correspondence
between Title II and Title VIII, that the taxes are imposed to balance the appropriations authorized so that the federal budget will not be distorted. Assume, therefore, that in its inquiry as to the validity of the taxes, the Court professes power to
inquire also into the budget and is convinced that Title II is the sine qua non.and
major justification for the tax. As stated previously, no amount of analysis or
psychoanalysis of the Act can disclose any purpose for the tax other than that of
raising revenue. Unlike tax acts previously declared unconstitutional, this Act is
obviously intended to promote rather than retard the frequency of the subject taxed,
to raise more and more rather than less and less revenue. And unlike the A.A.A.
expenditures, the Tide II expenditures are to be made without requiring anybody,
by way of contract or condition, to act or refrain from acting in any manner. There
is no penalty, no regulation, no attempt to "purchase compliance,"-only a tax and
an expenditure. The benefits are paid only to those aged who do not continue in
employment. But they are neither coerced nor tempted by the Act to retire from
service. The benefit payments are considerably smaller than wages. A person who
chooses to remain in service after 65 receives his wages rather thafi benefits until he
is retired. He prejudices in no way his right to benefits upon retirement, the amount
of the monthly benefits, or the amount of the death payments. The provision is
simply that an individual shall not be paid both benefits and wages for the same
month. To regard this as a coercion or purchase of retirement comes close to
regarding unemployment relief or poor relief as a coercion or purchase of unemployment or poverty.
Is the appropriation one for the common defense and general welfare? In the
A.A.A. case the Court concluded that the general welfare was sought to be promoted
not by the simple donation of money but by the purchase with that money of
restraints which Congress was otherwise unauthorized to impose. On the interpretation of the general welfare clause, however, the Court adopted unreservedly the
so-called broad or Hamiltonian point of view that the power to authorize expenditures of public money is not confined in its objectives to the other enumerated
powers of the federal government but may be exercised broadly for the promotion
of the national general welfare. The Court expressly declined "to ascertain the scope
of the phrase 'general welfare of the United States' of to determine whether an
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appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within it."8' The Court has undertaken
to ascertain whether-a tax is, in its view, truly that or something else. But it has
never undertaken to ascertain whether the object of an appropriation is, in its view,
the general welfare. In a century and a half of history that issue has been left to the
judgffient of CQngress.
Unless one is to set himself up as an omniscient economist or sociologist with
unerring prophetic wisdom, it must be conceded that there-is abundant support for
the Congressional determination that the tax and expenditure will promote the constitutional objectives. The Act operates throughout the United States on a universal
phenomenon-advancing age. It promises to introduce for the American population
as a whole a more certain income, a more continuous purchasing power, a more
secure future. It is expected thus to promote general prosperity, avoid precipitate
dips of depression and foster our national commerce. And it is expected thus to
produce a healthier, more confident, more contented and more loyal citizenry-for
common defense and general .welfare in war and in peace. Expenditures for a
national monument at Gettysburg 2 or for bonuses or pensions to ex-soldiers are
hardly more closely related to the future common defense and general welfare, of
the United States than expenditures for assurance of security to the national population and for lightening the burden on the young generation to support the old.
There is another close federal purpose-the purpose to piotect thE government
finances. Under Title I of the Act, the federal government has undertaken to aid
the. states financially in the provision of relief for the needy aged. It. is quite clear
that federal aid will be necessary and will be extended so long as the need for relief
continues. The constitutionality of federal expenditures for this purpose has already
been discussed. As a practical matter, regardless of individual private opinion, those
expenditures are constitutional and we can start with that as a datum. Whether
such expenditures by the federal government will be required continuously or only
in the recurrent periods of depression is not inaterial for the present point. The
fact is that the federal government is under a present and potential liability to provide large sums of money for the relief of the needy aged. Now the evidence is
convincing that the numbers of aged and needy aged in our population will constantly increase for a considerable period in the future, and that the expenditures
for relief to the needy aged will, for that reason and others, mount at a rapid rate.
The financial burden on the federal government, therefore, threatens to be quite
heavy. To ease that burden and provide against it by application to its source is one
function of Title II. In a large sense, it is a civilized substitute for an, old and now
unsatisfactory system of relief. Insofar, then, as the Title VIII taxes are provisions
against anticipated federal obligations, they are the result of a typical and traditional
exercise of the taxing power.
'x 56

Sup. Ct. at 320.

'U. S. v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 16o U. S. 668 (x896).
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Of course, Title II is not limited to relief of the needy aged. A very substantial
portion of the beneficiaries of Tide II will be needy. Another portion would be
needy but for the operation of the Act. Some probably will not and' would not be
needy. Tide II is not merely a palliative. It attempts to cure the condition and
prevent its recurrence. It is a civilized measure precisely because it is focussed on the
social problem rather than on the individual symptoms. And it is certainly wise
statesmanship that a provision against future obligations should rely upon systematic,
automatic administration and avoid the costs, the wastes, the dissatisfactions, the
humiliations and the dangers of individual determinations of need.
What has been said would seem to answer the possible objection that the Act
invades the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Provision of
the kind of benefits contemplated by Title II can hardly be regarded as' of merely
local concern in view of our own recent history and the history of all other industrial
countries. The national interest in the welfare of the national population is obvious.
That the Act is calculated to promote that welfare is also clear. The issue is only
whether the nation has power to enact the specific legislation in furtherance of that
interest. National interest in the general welfare has been deemed insufficient to
warrant coercive national regulation of local commerce, even though that regulation
might promote the general welfare, because the national power to regulate commerce is limited to interstate commerce. But the criterion of the power to tax and
appropriate is only the purpose to promote the general welfare. That power expressly conferred is, as the Chief Justice stated in the T.V.A. case, not abridged by
the Tenth Amendment.33 Granted that Titles VIII and II only tax and appropriate,
then they are within Congressional power. The A.A.A. case and its predecessors
contain, as pointed out above, no warrant for a contrary holding. In all of them, the
legislation *did more than tax and appropriate.
The charge that while the tax is not a penalty or regulation it is still not a "true"
tax but rather an "exaction" or "expropriation of money from one group for the
benefit of another" in violation of the due process clause is largely unfounded invective. It is difficult to think of the persons taxed under Tide VIII and the persons
entitled to benefits under Title II as different "groups." If the funds required
under Title II were collected by means of some other general tax, a sales tax or the
income tax, the charge could hardly be made. In a sense all taxes are exactions of
money from one group for the benefit of another. No expenditure returns to the
taxpayer direct benefits, or indirect benefits through the general welfare, exactly proportioned to his tax payments. Tax money expended for soldiers' bonuses, for
relief of the unemployed and the needy, and for pensions to Presidents' widows and
civil servants is in direct form money exacted from one group for the benefit of
another. In substance the case is no less clear with respect to the protective tariff and
3356 Sup. Ct. at 475: "To the extent that the power of disposition is thus expressly conferred, it is
manifest that the Tenth Amendment is not applicable. And tlie Ninth Amendment . . . does not withdraw the rights which are expressly granted to the federal government."
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the ta: es paid by that class of the population who smoke tobacco and drink liquor.
Yet that is hardly expropriation. The legislative determination that the taxes and
expenditures are for the general welfare is a determination that they are for the
benefit of the taxpayers as well as the direct recipients of the expenditures. There is,
and can be, no requirement that taxes or expenditures benefit all taxpayers in precisely the same manner or in degrees exactly proportioned to their taxes. The charge
of "expropriation" raises no new issue even though it points to a psychological
hazard.
Similar is the charge that by Titles VIII and II the federal government has
embarked upon the insurance business in competition with private enterprise. In
point of fact, the statement is quite untrue. There is practically no private enterprise
in the limited field in which these tides operate. And there is practically no prospect
that private enterprise can or will occupy the field. But legally, the charge even if
true does not condemn. If competition with private enterprise is the consequence of
an exercise of a power granted by the Constitution, then it is a consequence permitted
by the Constitution. The fact of competition with private enterprise was accorded
no significance in the T.V.A. case because competition was the necessary consequence
of the granted power to dispose of property properly acquired. Yet there the competition was real and obvious. And the Court sanctioned a disposal of the property
in not the least but in the most competitive manner. It sanctioned the purchase of
transmission lines, as an incident of the power to dispose, in order to effect a more
competitive disposal. Tides VIII and II do.nothing more than tax and give for the
general welfare-powers admittedly granted to Congress.
It may be said, however, that the field is reserved for private enterprise regardless of whether or not private enterprise has chosen to occupy it. But constitutional
law does not define the kind of enterprises into which government may enter beyond
prescribing that the taxation shall be for the "general welfare," or, as it is frequently
put,. for a "public purpose." States and their subdivisions have been permitted to
engage in a variety of enterprises under this limitation. 4 The test is not rigid, but
concerns itself with judgment as to need in each instance. It asks how great is the
public need for the particular service; how important to the life of the community is
the service; how adequately or inadequately is it furnished by private enterprise;
how extensively does the government propose to furnish it and how seriously does
the government's activity interfere with private enterprise. What has already been
said sufficiently answers these questions. For similar reasons the federal government
is already in the banking business with its Land Banks and others and in the insurance business under the War Risk Insurance Act. The alleged eritry into and competition with pri-ate business is a ghost having no reality-but it is a ghost which
may frighten, and fright may prompt unwise and unjustified action.
One further point. If we look into the expenditures for the purpose of discover'See,

e.g., Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S.
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(1920); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917).
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ing possible grounds for invalidating the taxes, we should not neglect the evidence
thus made available for rebuttal of objections to the taxes. The scheme of benefits
provided in Title II, if considered in connection with Title VIII, affords independent
answer to the objections of inequality and due process previously discussed.
TITE IX

Much of what has been said about Tide VIII is, of course, equally applicable to
the tax imposed by Tide IX. Thus, the questions as to the selection of the employment of others as the subject of the tax, the'exemption of certain employment and
geographical uniformity need not be discussed again. The additional exemption of
employers of less than eight employees should occasion no difficulty. Minor exercises
of a privilege are commonly exempted from taxes on the privilege. The gift tax,
the inheritance tax, the amusement tax all begin a little above the bottom, though
the respective privileges are exercised when the gift or inheritance is below the
taxable amount or the cost of the amusement cheaper. Likewise, the additional factor
that credits upon the tax are allowed for payments under state laws and the state
laws may vary, introduces no difficulty with respect to the requirement of uniformity.
Geographical uniformity is still provided. The divergence is due not to the Act but
to the uncontrolled distribution of the phenomena upon which the Act operates.
Wherever the phenomenon occurs, the Act operates. Precisely similar divergence
exists with reference to the credits and deductions for state tax payments allowed in
the federal estate tax in the federal income tax. "Congress cannot accommodate
its legislation to the conflicting or dissimilar laws of the several states no" control
the diverse conditions to be found in the various states which necessarily work unlike
results from the enforcement of the same tax. All that the Constitution (Article I,
Section 8, clause i) requires is that the law still shall be uniform in the sense that by
the provisions the rule of liability shall be the same in all parts of the United States" '3 5
The scheme of Tide IX is modeled on the federal estate tax which passed muster
before the Supreme Court in Florida v. Mellon.3 6 That tax may "be credited with
the amount of any estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes paid to any State,"
the credit not to exceed 8o per cent of the federal tax. The legislation was assailed
on the ground that it constituted "an invasion of the sovereign rights of the state
and a direct effort on the part of Congress to coerce the state into imposing an
inheritance tax and to penalize it and its property and citizens for the failure to do
so." Said the Court: "The act assailed [Section 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926 ] was
passed by Congress in pursuance of its power to lay and collect taxes, and, following
the decision of this court in respect of the preceding act of 1916, New York Trust
'3 7
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S.345, must be held to be constitutional.
Prior to the 1926 Act the credit upon the federal estate tax allowed for state tax
'Florida v. Mellon,
" Supra note

32.

273 U. S. 12, 17 (1927).

'Id. at z6, 17.
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payments was not to exceed 25 per cent of the federal tax.8 s At that time Florida,
which had no inheritance tax, did not complain. It was still a favored and profitable
state of domicile-for persons of large estates. Then Section 301 of the 1926 Act increased the credit to 8o per cent. It was that increase that made it insufficiently
profitable for such persons to become domiciled in Florida. And it was that increased
credit which Florida challenged as being less an attempt to raise revenue and more
an attempt to coerce non-inheritance-tax states to impose inheritance taxes, or at
least to remove Florida's advantage as a prospective state of domicile over the states
which did have inheritance taxes. The characterization seemed quite apt. Here
was an attempt to raise revenue which would obviously result in reducing revenue
by some 75 per cent. Yet the tax is constitutional. It produces some revenue. It
reduces, by the credit and not necessarily by the increase in the credit, the burden
of cumulatiye taxation. It recognizes state policy and preserves sources for state
revenue, though frustrating another state policy like that of Florida. It does not
directly attempt to discourage or coerce action by individuals. And it does not
attempt or hope to discourage the frequency of the subject taxed.
The legal form of Title IX is a faithful replica of its model. It, too, allows a
credit only for money paid under compulsion of state law (except for the additional
credit under Section 9io, to be mentioned presently). It, too, will raise substantial
.revenue, even if all taxpayers become eligible for the credit. It hopes to encourage
rather than discourage the frequency of the subject taxed. It, too,- is designed to
.avoid cumulative *taxationand permit the execution of state policy. The additional
credit allowed by Section 9io is but additional precaution against undue inter"ference with state policy. If additional credit were not allowed, the Act would tend
to proscribe a type of state unemployment compensation plan which is already in
existence (viz., the "Wisconsin" or "employer reserve" plan) and for which there is a
good deal of demand and promise. It would be quite paradoxical if such measures,
enacted under an express power and designed to protect the states in the execution
of their policies, were deemed to be invasions of the states' powers.
There are, however, some differences. Credit on the Title IX tax is allowed only
for payment under such state laws as are found by the Social Security Board to
comply with the conditions enumerated in Section 9o3. The conditions concern
solely the provisions of the state laws under which the state payments are made by
the taxpayers and relate only to the administration and expenditure of the funds
collected; .and the funds are required to be deposited in the Treasury of the United
States. The conditions are in large part similar to those discussed earlier with
reference to the grants-in-aid. Granted the power to tax and the power to allow
credits for payments under state laws, it is difficult to find substantial constitutional
ground for denying to Congress choice as to the kind of state laws that may qualify
payments for the credit. This is not a purchase of compliance by individuals; the
'Revenue Act of 1924, §301 (b), 43 STAT. 304.
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choice is not theirs and they cannot comply. Nor is this less non-coercive upon the
states than the common conditions in grants-in-aid or than the estate tax upon
Florida.
The further difference that most states had inheritance taxes when the 1926
Revenue Act was passed, while most states had no unemployment compensation laws
when the Social Security Act was passed seems similarly inrsignificant. The point
suggested is, of course, that because of this difference the latter act is in fact coercive
though the former is not. But coercion in fact cannot be so blithely established. It
is commonly believed that many states would have had unemployment compensation laws were it not for the fear of competition from stateg without such laws. If
that is the fact, then the former states have been awaiting the opportunity made
available by Title IX. On the other hand, at the tirrie of the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1926, or thereafter, there may have been states which desired to
repeal or reduce their inheritance taxes but were deterred by that Act from doing
so. Moreover, in almost all the states it became profitable to increase the inheritance
taxes in order to take advantage of the increased credit. If the 1926 change is
regarded, rather than the initial smaller credit, the suggested difference disappears.
There is no coercion in either case, as there is also no coercion in the grants-in-aid,
because the same choice is provided. Congress may tax with an eye to the future as
well as to the present.
If the argument thus far has carried conviction, there is no need for going farther.
But there may still lurk a suspicion that we cannot "shut our eyes" to the fact that
the purpose of the tax is to procure unemployment compensation and that somehow
that makes a difference. The suspicion raises with respect to the Title IX tax the
same issues which have akeady been discussed with respect to the Title VIII tax.
Only little additional discussion is necessary.
Suppose that the tax were professedly levied for the establishment of a federal
unemployment compensation fund to be collected, administered and expended by
he federal government. Would it be within the power of Congress to lay taxes
to provide for the common defense and general welfare? Are federal expenditures
for unemployment relief, expenditures for a federal purpose, the general welfare?
The question deserves the emphasis of Chief Justice White's favorite reply: merely
to ask the question is to provide the answer. In a period of severe criticism of
federal policy and federal spending almost no one is heard to say that the present
unemployment is not a national problem, that the federal government should not or
cannot spend its monies for the relief of unemployment. There are differencessharp or fancied-as to methods, projects, amounts and procedures. But all seem to
agree that the federal government may and must feel a responsibility and attempt
to discharge it. If, then, unemployment is a national ill, its cure would be obviously
for the general welfare and Congress, therefore, may appropriate money for that
purpose. Whether payment of money to the unemployed will in fact tend to relieve
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the ills of unemployment and thus promote the general ivelfare is a matter for legislative determination. But none will deny that the Congressional determination in
the affirmative has abundant reasonable support.
If the payment of money to the unemployed is a proper federal expenditure, then
the federal government may levy taxes in preparation for the outlay. The Act would
provide for no more than the collection of taxes and the payment of benefits. Both
powers are in terms granted to the federal government. No substantial issue under
the Tenth Amendment would be involved. Neither the Constitution nor the spirit
of federalism commands that relief for the unemployed or the aged is a matter for
state concern.3 9 When the distress is or threatens to be national in scope and relief
is necessary for the national welfare, the matter is one for federal concern. And the
federal concern is here translated into action, not through some prohibited power of
regulation, but solely through the granted power to tax and appropriate.
Nor would the due process clause present any serious obstacle. Concededly, the
purpose of the tax would be to foster the general welfare. General welfare not
simply because of the betterment of the lot of those unemployed for the time, but
general welfare because of the stimulation or maintenance of industry and commerce
through the greater stabilization of purchasing power. And general welfare by the
prevention of demoralization and despondency and by the stimulation of confidence
and loyalty in the populace, a federal concern, as pointed out above, in peace as well
as war.
If the purpose of Title IX is to provide unemployment compensation on the basis
of state administration under federal supervision, it is but an alternative method for
a nationally administered unemployment compensation plan. With the latter available, the choice of the former can hardly be regarded as an invasion of powers
reserved to the states. With powei to supplant the states, Congress has instead
invited them to precede. The wisdom of the choice has been discussed elsewhere.
Its consistency with the spirit of federalism seems hardly open to question. At least,
so it seems to me.
The use of the word "concern" is not meant as an acceptance of a particular theory as to the meaning of the Tenth Amendment. The Constitution, it has been pointed out, speaks of powers; and it is
powers, not fields, subjects, or concerns, that are reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. See
Collier, supra note 3, at 224. There may be much significance in the difference." But the present argument is addressed to the judicial rather than the constitutional term. Cf. the opinion of the Chief Justice
in the T.V.AI. case (56 Sup. Ct. at 479): "The constitutional provision is silent as to the method of disposing of property belonging to the United States. That method, of course, must be an appropriate means
of disposition according to the nature of the property, it must be one adopted in the public interest as
distinguished from private or personal ends, and we may assume that it must be consistent with the
foundation principles of our dual system of government and must not be contrived to govern the concerns
reserved to the States." The Social Security Act satisfies these requirements.

